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29 March 1982

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 20/82)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES

UNITED KINGDOM

NOTT STATEMENT, COMMONS DEBATE ON TRIDENT

PM121247 London THE TIMES in English 12 Mar 82 p 4

[Unattributed report of 11 March UK House of Commons session: "Opposition Pledge To Cancel Trident"]

[Text] The announcement by Mr John Nott, secretary of state for defence, that the cabinet had decided to buy Trident nuclear missiles from the United States to replace Polaris was met with a firm undertaking by Mr John Silkin, Labour defense spokesman, to cancel the Trident project.

Mr Nott said in his statement: On 15 July 1980, my predecessor announced the government's decision in favour of Trident as the replacement force for Polaris; but as I told the Defence Committee of the House in March last year final decisions were still needed on the type of submarine and the choice of missile.

We have now decided that our four trident submarines, to be built at Vickers, Barrow, will have a larger hull section than previously planned, and will incorporate an advanced propulsion system and the latest sonars. And after detailed consideration here, and with the United States, we have now decided also to purchase the Trident II D5, instead of the Trident I C4 missile system, from the United States.

The number of warheads that the Trident II D5 missile will carry, and therefore Trident's striking power, remains wholly a matter of choice for the British Government; our intention is that the move to D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads than we originally envisaged for our Trident I C4 force.

The reasons for our choice of Trident II D5 are briefly as follows:

Just as the Polaris system will, by the mid-1990's have been in service for approaching 30 years and will have reached the end of its operational life--so the Trident system must remain a credible deterrent for a similar period and thus remain operational until 2020--that is 40 years from now.

Our experience with Polaris and the decision--endorsed by the last Labour government--to modernise the Polaris missile with Chevaline at great cost, has shown us the financial and operational penalties of running and developing a United Kingdom unique system.

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Following President Reagan's decision to accelerate the Trident II D5 programme, if we were to choose the C4 missile, it would enter service with the Royal Navy only shortly before it left service with the United States.

This would mean that the United Kingdom would be alone responsible for keeping open special Trident I C4 support facilities in the United States and the United Kingdom alone would be forced to fund, as we have with Chevaline, any research and development needed to counter improved Soviet anti-ballistic missile defences.

For these reasons our judgment is that the through-life costs of Trident I would almost certainly be higher than Trident II.

Accordingly we have entered into an agreement with the United States to purchase Trident II.

The United States Government is selling Trident II to us on more advantageous terms than Trident I. The missile will be purchased by us at the same price as the United States Navy's own requirements in accordance with the Polaris sales agreement. The additional overheads and levies will be lower than would have been the case under our 1980 agreement to purchase Trident I C4. In particular the so-called B&D levy will in fact be fixed sum in real terms, and there will be a complete waiver of the facilities charge which was part of the C4 deal. I would emphasise to the House that the terms protect us completely from development cost escalation.

Finally the United States will waive certain of the Buy American Act provisions and set up a liaison office in London to advise British industry on how they can compete--on equal terms with United States industry--for sub-contracts for weapon system components for the D5 programme as a whole, including the American programme.

When I appeared before the House of Commons Defence Committee I made it clear that the range of options which we still had to study for the Trident system, over and above the total cost of 5,000M pounds then given, could be confined within an additional 1,000M pounds at 1980 prices and exchange rates--and so it will.

On this basis the initial capital costs of the Trident II D5 missile system will be an extra 390M pounds above the Trident I C4 missile system which represents an addition of about 7 percent to the total cost. And we have now decided also to fit the latest propulsion system, the British pressurized water reactor 2, already under development, and improved sonar systems which together with the larger hull will add about a further 500M pounds to the cost, which will mean additional work for British industry but within the 1,000M pounds total increase.

These changes will greatly improve the efficiency and the quietness of the submarines. As a result we are planning to run our submarines for around seven years between refits so that the availability of the submarines for patrol can be greatly increased. This will allow us to maintain three boats

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in the operating cycle for a high proportion of the time. The Trident II D5 missile should also have an in-tube life within the submarine of at least seven years, a much longer period than for Polaris thus greatly reducing maintenance which will be largely carried out on board the submarine.

[PM121249] At September 1980 prices, therefore, we will spend on Trident about 6,000M pounds. Updating the price basis on September 1981 prices, which reflects a much lower exchange rate than in September 1980, adds a total of about 1,500M pounds, so the total cost over the procurement period will, in 1981 prices, be 7,500M pounds against an estimated total defence budget over the same period of approaching 250,000M pounds; that is just over 3 percent of the total defence budget.

This means we will spend on Trident at current prices an average of somewhat under 500M pounds a year against total defence spending of 14,000M pounds a year.

I am making available a document explaining the government's decision which also shows how the cost of Trident compares with the anticipated capital expenditure on our conventional forces. This information has not been published before.

From this it can be seen that Trident expenditure over the next 15 years is a far smaller amount than our planned expenditure on equipment for our major conventional capabilities such as anti-submarine warfare or offensive air operations. With the 3 percent growth in the defence budget until 1985-86, several billions of pounds extra in real terms will still be available to spend on our conventional defences in future years.

For about 3 percent of the defence budget we will be modernizing the British Independent Nuclear Force that successive governments have considered to be essential for our national security over the past 30 years. Nothing has happened to change that need--rather the reverse.

The government remains convinced that no other choice but Trident will provide a credible nuclear deterrent into the year 2000 and beyond; no other use of our resources could possibly contribute as much to our security and the deterrent strength of NATO as a whole.

To choose a system lacking in credibility to an aggressor, or still more, to abandon unilaterally a capability we have now maintained for three decades, would be a futile gesture that would serve to increase rather than diminish the risk of war.

Mr John Silkin: Labour will cancel the Trident project. (Labour cheers and Conservative protests.) We will do so for three basic reasons.

First, this programme escalates the arms race, particularly in the light of the Geneva talks and the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament--and incidentally I hope that the prime minister is going to that special session.

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Second, the project breaks the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the spirit, if not the letter, of that treaty, (Conservative shouts of "nonsense").

Third, the expense, despite everything Mr Nott says, has an effect on our conventional forces which destroys the security of these islands.

He may bamboozle his cabinet colleagues but not this House when he says it will be done for 3 percent of defence expenditure. What he does not tell the House is that it will be nearly a quarter of expenditure on new equipment in the major and maximum years.

Is the pressure being maintained on the United States Government for the United Kingdom to take part in the Geneva talks? If we are to have this new and devastating weapons system, we should be at the top table Mr Nott talks of so often.

How many of the 50,000 lost jobs resulting from the devastation done to the conventional forces will be offset by this programme?

How can he be so certain about costs when we have no experience of building submarines of this sort, which are much larger than anyone has had before? We have no experience even of the warheads.

Mr Nott: It is no surprise to anyone that the Labour Party, if it comes to power, will cancel Trident. We realize the pressures on Mr Silkin from his party. We have to be realists about his difficulties.

Trident II will represent only about 3 to 4 percent of the planned number of Soviet strategic missiles. That is approximately the same proportion Polaris represented of the Russian strategic nuclear missile force when it was introduced.

It is not true to say that this escalates the arms race. If there is an arms race, it comes from the Soviet Union which is introducing one new SS-20 every week. This is no more than the modernization of the existing force which we have retained for 30 years.

It does not break the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is an inaccurate statement. (Labour interruptions) Nor the spirit. The Non-Proliferation Treaty never sought to refer to existing nuclear powers. (A Labor MP: Of course it did.)

On the question of conventional forces, Mr Silkin is not in a position to lecture us. There are approaching 30,000 more regular reservists; every unit is up to strength. There are a third more tanks manned in Germany than when we became the government and the amount spent on defence equipment with British industry in the coming year will have doubled since the last election.

[PM121251] If there is a difference at all, it is only on nuclear policy where the previous Labour government modernized Polaris secretly by Chevaline and we are doing so openly on Trident.



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Vickers Barrow has an excellent record. It has built WW nuclear submarines with no real cost increase at all.

Technology is very much the same and we shall benefit from the experience of the United States in building Ohio.

Trident II will have the same warhead as Trident I and that is already tested and development far advanced. I know of no reason for any escalation in that cost at all. The Americans have a good record of developing missiles to cost and we are protected by a fixed sum.

The PWR II is nearly developed and we have an enormous contingency allowance in these figures.

If Labour cancels, 4,000M pounds of business will be lost to British industry. I do not think any of us have ever believed Labour assurances in opposition before. They have always proved wrong in the past and there is no reason to believe that they are any different now.

Mr David Steel, leader of the Liberal Party (Roxburg, Selkirk and Peebles): The fact that this government is continuing openly what the previous government did secretly is not an argument about the merits of the independent nuclear deterrent. Since no other political party in the House accepts this programme, the likelihood of cancellation is high.

What discussion has he had with our allies on that, particularly since it is not required under our obligations to NATO?

Leaving aside future commitments in the defence budget on pay, pensions, buildings and so on, the real percentage cost of this is over 20 percent of the capital procurement programme. That is the real effect on the conventional defence system.

Will he be more explicit about the compensation which he believes he has obtained for the jobs lost in our dockyards and electronics industries through cutbacks in conventional forces?

Mr Nott: Our conventional forces are greatly strengthened beyond what they were 2.5 years ago and in a whole range of areas the capability of our conventional forces has been transformed since May 1979. Our allies welcomed the decision to introduce the Trident programme.

I have looked at every possible option for the modernization of Polaris with, I hope and believe, a totally open mind. If he were trying to select an independent nuclear capability that is going to take us way into the year 2000 and beyond he would find, as I have found, that there is only one option and that is the Trident system.

Trident will take up on average about six percent over the years of our total equipment budget. At its peak it will take up about 11.5 percent of equipment spending.

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For the security of these islands this country can afford over the next 18 years to spend 3 percent of the defence budget on this capability. It is essential for the maintenance of peace and the defence of these islands.

Mr Anthony Buck (Colchester, C): MP's on both sides of the House who try to give even-handed consideration to these matters will welcome this. The main considerations are the same as those which caused the Labour Party to conclude that it was right to go for Chevaline. There will be many jobs for British industry.

Mr Nott: We are talking about large numbers of jobs for British industry and a huge programme which will stretch over 18 years while this modernization is being brought forward. We have debated this matter openly and arrived at a unanimous decision after long debate within the government.

Chevaline seemed necessary to the previous government to keep Polaris credible as a deterrent to the Soviet Union over the next 10 years. There is no point in retaining a strategic independent deterrent if it is not credible in the eyes of the Soviets. That is the judgment we have to make.

Sir Hugh Fraser (Stratford and Stone, C): We are now involved in weaponry which is essentially that of a super power. There must be an effect on our conventional military budget and also other parts of it. Several conservative MPs find this difficult to accept, too.

Mr Nott: History shows that the long bow successively was needed to modernize the crossbow and that the pitchfork was not sufficient in the day of the crossbow.

The threat facing this country comes from a super power. He is wrong if he thinks we can defend ourselves against such a power with inadequate weapons.

Mr David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport, SDP): He should correct the misleading impression that the Chevaline decision was made by the last Labour government. It was made by Mr Edward Heaths' administration and planned and thought about in the previous Labour government.

Many people, including servicemen, who have had the same information as Mr Nott, regret his decision to spend, in current prices, 8,000M pounds on Trident. They feel it would have been wiser to spend money on Polaris motors, to have extended the life of Polaris.

Mr Nott: I should have said Chevaline was endorsed by the last Labor government and carried on by it secretly.

I am not sure who are the servicemen with the information Dr Owen mentions, though I know I am in trouble with the information, and there are few, who are unanimously in favour of this decision.

Our Polaris submarines going on into the [year] 2000 would be too noisy and would be detected.

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Mr Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton, C): He has negotiated a successful agreement at a price less than many of us feared for what is unquestionably the finest strategic system best suited to the needs of the United Kingdom.

What guarantees are there that during the currency of the procurement of this system it will not be cancelled either at the whim of the United States Congress or by any changes of presidency or of presidential mood or attitude over the next 20 years?

Mr Nott: On the whole our allies tend to keep to their agreements. I do not think such a hypothetical situation has ever arisen before.

We will build most of this system here with British industry. It is only the missile and the missile control system that we are buying from the United States. The majority of the expenditure will be here in the United Kingdom. There is nothing in the technology that we here are not capable of producing.

In the French socialist government, the communists have declared their colours and they are spending 20 percent of their present defence budget on their nuclear deterrent. We could do this ourselves as we proved with Chevaline but it would be expensive and it is cheaper to buy the technology from the United States.

Mr Keith Speed (Ashford, C): If the choice is between modernizing Polaris, or C4 or D5 he is right to for D5 there is no alternative. What is the percentage of the naval equipment programme at the apogee of the Trident expenditure?

I am concerned about the submarine building capacity once we have the system, to build SSNs, which are getting old. Who is to build the new 2,400 SSKs?

Mr Nott: We have a defence equipment programme. What I am concerned about is defence capabilities. I look at our overall defences.

On the Trident programme, we are finding money for it as a separate item. Because Trident is going to be manned by the Royal Navy, it is easier to manage this programme under the Royal Navy and put it into their programme.

It is not right to say that if we had not had Trident the naval programme would have been any different. That would not be logical. It is financed by the defence programme.

The SSN programme is going forward as planned when he was with me. We will build as many as we can at Vickers Barrow, until the moment comes when Trident takes over. As for the SSK, we have not yet placed orders for them but as soon as we do we will look to see which yards will take them.

Mr Nott, answering later questions, said that the running cost of the existing strategic deterrent and of Trident were low. The strategic deterrent probably only required about 4,000 to 5,000 people to keep it operational whereas there were 650,000 people for defence overall. In terms of revenue it was small; 1.5 percent or so of the defence budget.

Mr Denzil Davies for the Opposition (Llanelli, Lab): The figure of [as published] is merely one of those carefully massaged Ministry of Defence figures put to cabinet to try and get past the treasury. The figure will be higher.

The decision is an emotional spasm which pays no attention to the test ban treaty or to the arms limitation talks and merely will bring the danger of a nuclear holocaust that much closer.

Mr Nott: If it is an emotional spasm, it has been a disease of eight successive governments. We will keep on with the strategic deterrent his government had until the end of its operational life and Trident will replace it.

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TERRORISM

ITALY

OVERVIEW OF ALLEGED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TIES

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 25 Jan 82 pp 6-8

[Article by Stefano Silvestri: "That Day in Lausanne"]

[Text] A meeting of Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction, and George Habbash's Palestinian extremists. This is the trail that our intelligence agents followed. We have reconstructed the mosaic, piece by piece.

He spoke of "international collegiality" among subversive groups, alluding to the possible existence of an international strategy of destabilization. He mentioned the Italian-French kidnapper terrorists working in the South of France; the ground-air missile plans that Roman Autonomy leader Daniele Pifano had in his possession when he was arrested in Ortona; the frequent trips by Italian terrorists to Eastern countries and the Third World as well as other Western countries with terrorist movements; training camps in Lebanon and Libya; joint anti-NATO action by the Red Brigades in Italy and the RAF [Red Army Faction] in Germany.

In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on Monday 11 January, Council President Giovanni Spadolini maintained the existence of foreign terrorism centers (an idea dear to Sandro Pertini, the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] and the PSI) with a wealth of detail that earned him the praise of the socialist daily AVANTI! for the first time in months.

Spadolini did not spare the arguments, for he was pressed by the necessity to put an end to the disputes that had flared up recently within the intelligence agencies, and by concern over increasing uneasiness within the armed forces. At the last minute he added a sentence to his speech: it concerned the 16 foreigners expelled from Italy in 1980 and the 10 expelled in 1981 (among whom were about 15 Libyans).

Many thought that these people, too, were in league with terrorists. Not so. Actually, none of the expulsions (as far as EUROPEO has managed to ascertain) had anything to do with terrorists. Of those expelled, only three were diplomatic representatives of some kind (one of them was probably the Russian commercial vice-attache Zazulin, who replaced Boris Ossokin a year ago, after Ossokin had been expelled), but they had more to do with industrial secrets than terrorism. Nor were there any Czechoslovakian names among those of foreigners sent home. The last time anything had been done about officials from that country (Military Attache Karol Kluf and the Turin vice-consul) goes back to 1979, but in previous years there had been a virtual slaughter (29 expelled in 1968, and another 19 in the period 1975-78).

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Prague obviously got such a bad press from being singled out as a possible base for international terrorism that it decided to be more careful.

Spadolini's remarks are not in themselves alarming. People have been talking for years about contacts between the various terrorist groups. Up to now, though, the Italian government had appeared somewhat divided, uncertain and devoid of absolute proof. Now Spadolini has decided to embrace the theory of international coordination. But can he prove it? And what will the consequences be?

EUROPEO has learned that the Italian intelligence agencies' most recent information concerns a meeting in Lausanne of the new BR [Red Brigades] hardliners (those who kidnapped Gen James Dozier and are commonly called "militarists"), the remains of the German RAF and probably some Palestinians from the rejectionist front (led by George Habbash, Naif Hawatmeh, or Ahmed Jibril, all of whom are leaders historically tied to the USSR or Libya). This meeting is said to have confirmed cooperation that had been going on since 1975, when a group of representatives met in the coven at Via Piacenza, Turin, and drew up a plan of concerted operations for these groups. In 1980, the German police discovered indications in Monaco that Italian, German, and Palestinian terrorists had decided to attack NATO targets.

But it is hard to say just how solid this international network is. One indication comes from the dealings in arms used by the terrorists, but it is not unequivocal.

It would seem at first glance that there was a kind of jump in quality at the beginning of the 70's. Even in 1974, for example, Valerio Morucci and Libero Maesano were arrested in Chiasso while trying to smuggle a machine gun. Switzerland is a large arms-smuggling center (the arms are mostly stolen from its army arsenals); as the Swiss franc has risen in value, cigarette smuggling is no longer competitive, which explains why it has become fashionable to smuggle arms through Chiasso and Varese. At the beginning of the 70's, Sergio Spazzali (younger brother of the more famous lawyer, Giuliano), along with Giuseppe Salvati and Roberto Mander, tried to bring recycled Swiss arms into Italy. But then the scene changed.

The motley array of Western arms on the black market were replaced by Czechoslovak and Russian arms (as well as Belgian, probably coming from Libya), with plenty of ammunition. In the attack on the DC party headquarters on Piazza Nicosia, Rome, the Kalashnikov rifles used Russian bullets made in 1978; one of the rifles, as ascertained by investigating judge Fernando Imposimato, of Rome, came from Saudi Arabia. Also appearing were sophisticated weapons, such as Pifano missiles or those secreted recently in Giovanni Senzani's hideout. Senzani's were equal to those used by the German RAF to try to assassinate U.S. General Kroesen. There were also the strange French SNEB [expansion unknown] missiles, which are hard to use (they can be launched only from airplanes or helicopters against ground targets). But missiles of this type are loaded on the Siai Marchetti SF 260 aircraft that Italy has sold to Libya.

About the middle of the 70's, then, Italian terrorists began to be supplied with serious war materiel, which was mostly recycled from the Arab front. These were also the years when Libya was beginning to rearm heavily the rejectionist front in Lebanon. And 1975 is the year of the Tel el-Zaatar battle in Beirut, where about a thousand Italian extremists participated in some fashion.

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The routes of the arms trade are innumerable; they go mostly by sea, probably through small Yugoslav ports. Mario Moretti seems to have been engaged in this in 1978-79; he was for a long time an uncatchable Red Brigadesman. And there were the Autonomy fugitive, Oreste Scalzone, and the BR "businessman," Maurizio Folini. Repentant terrorists, such as, most notably, Patrizio Peci, Alfredo Buonavita, Marco Barbone, and Fabrizio Giai, tell involved stories about yacht trips and contacts with the most varied intelligence agencies (even Israeli). In 1977, there was an attempt to import arms supplied by Basques from GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group] through a French terrorist movement, NAPAP [expansion unknown]. The former lieutenant of the legendary terrorist, Carlos (the one who held the oil ministers prisoner in Vienna in 1975), Hans Joachim Klein, talked about the possibility of using diplomatic pouches.

On top of all this come the revelations of Czechoslovakian exiles, Gen Jan Sejna and Gustav Frolik, who spoke of Eastern intelligence agencies involvement in domestic terrorism, leading to the South Tyrol dynamitings in 1961 and to the involvement of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Fabrizio Pelli, Augusto Viel, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, and others.

To delve deeper into this history, Italy has requested the unofficial collaboration of the SDECE [French Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], which did surveillance of the mysterious trip Moretti made to France just before his capture. Moretti went to France with a forged passport, probably setting out from Libya.

This is what we have been able to reconstruct on the basis of available information. The government has set things in motion but has not furnished the information necessary to complete the picture. Above all, it has not answered the main question. It is true that many contacts can be traced through terrorist movements. But does this justify talk about a foreign terrorism center? Spadolini did not mention it explicitly in his speech. Was it political timidity or lack of proof?

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POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI REICHLIN'S INTERVIEW ON PARTY POLICY

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 8 Feb 82 pp 51-53

[Interview with Alfredo Reichlin, a member of the PCI secretariat, by Chiara Valentini: "K As In 'Change'"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Without the K factor, the PCI is moving forward with increasing decisiveness as a force for change in Italy. It is the third way, and in this interview, Alfredo Reichlin takes the first concrete steps on this way.

Social democrats are splitting into various factions; socialists are in turmoil; severe critics suddenly change direction; and old friends waver. The Italian communists' break with Moscow is becoming a great, unexpected spectacle with every passing day. It is capable of initiating a chain of consequences and roiling the viscous world of Italian politics.

On the extent and implications of the third way, PANORAMA interviewed Alfredo Reichlin, a member of the PCI secretariat. He is one of the four communist leaders, along with Pietro Ingrao, Giorgio Napolitano, and even Enrico Berlinguer whom PRAVDA has labeled reprobates.

[Question] Now that the initial euphoria has subsided, people are generally beginning to recognize the historical importance of the break with Moscow. Carlo Donat Cattin says that the break has not really taken place; Alberto Ronchey recalls that even the PCUS [U.S. Communist Party] was supposed to change after the 20th Party Congress, but nothing ever came of it. For many people, then, the K factor is still present. How do you answer them?

[Answer] If the K factor means that the PCI cannot be trusted to be democratic and patriotic, then the K factor has never existed. It has just been a big alibi to keep our party out of the government. But now the alibi has broken down. But what has not broken down is what was behind it, and I mean K not as communism but as change. We have very radical ideas for change. And this makes me think that the confrontation will not diminish in the near future.

[Question] There are those who say that the exchange of accusations with Moscow is just beginning.

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[Answer] At the moment, everybody is concentrating on the argument between us and the Soviets. What they are ignoring is that the decisive issue is quite different. We want to confront what the European labor movement has not yet succeeded in confronting in depth, the problem of transforming the West. We want to bring new forces and goals into play. I do not think people have given enough thought to the fact that in defending the freedom of Polish workers we have been defending the freedom of Italian workers. We have opened the door to going beyond the ironclad laws of a world divided into blocs.

[Question] You have raised the issue of the third way, the new cloak that the PCI seems to have put on. Rivers of ink have flowed over this, but it is not yet clear whether it is the same thing as European social democracy or something new and different.

[Answer] In our ideas, political formation and tradition we are very different from social democrats. In the past, those parties mainly attacked the issue of redistribution of income. The great social democracies have managed to develop the so-called welfare state under historical conditions that allowed them to go without profoundly reforming capitalistic structures. That is what the present crisis is all about.

[Question] But it does not appear that you communists have a plan ready, either, to get us out of the present crisis.

[Answer] We are being pushed more and more to become a party not of ideology but of programs. There are only two ways out of the crisis: either strict authoritarianism or a new answer of a socialist kind. Hence we talk about a new quality of development and life. We are looking at new needs and a different mode of consumption.

[Question] You have opted for the democratic alternative to achieve all this. But Bettino Craxi seems hesitant to follow you on this route.

[Answer] We are strongly challenging the PSI to change its policy on short notice. We are making a thorough revision and are asking the PSI to do the same. We are asking them to take sides on the social front and renounce their deal with the DC [Christian Democratic Party] to get a limited slice of power. The PSI no longer has the reasons its used to to justify its alliance with the DC and to reject an agreement on the left or put it off indefinitely.

[Question] Francesco De Martino even speculates about reunification. Is this your idea, too?

[Answer] It is premature to talk about that; in any case, there is now an articulation and diversity on the left that is respected. The first item on the agenda is to begin a sincere, true, and open political dialogue with the socialists on prospects and programs.

[Question] What do you mean, concretely? A union of the left, as in France?

[Answer] At the moment, we want to begin getting together and conversing, of course, with the idea of launching a new political alternative. This would have immediate effects. First of all, it would shake up the DC and make it get off the fence. It would also give strength to the workers' struggle and, finally, rid management of the illusion that it can solve the crisis by making the workers pay for it.

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[Question] You mentioned the DC's fence-sitting. But Flaminio Piccoli has been very explicit in recognizing the value of your break with Moscow and the new cast it puts on the whole Italian political scene.

[Answer] The fence-sitting or ambiguity is not in what the DC are saying but in what they are. This DC party claims to be on the right, left and in the center, to be all things to all people. Piccoli proposes a waiting strategy for us communists and at the same time asks Craxi for an anti-communist pact. He has been able to do this so far because there has been no communication between us and the socialists. But once this barrier is down, the DC will have to get off the fence and go it alone politically.

[Question] How do you see an alternative future government? If you add your votes and those of the PSI, you do not have a majority; you don't even get 45 percent of the electorate.

[Answer] We are thinking of a broad coalition that would not necessarily reproduce Mitterrand's front. For example, Catholic people's parties would have to be involved. But a process such as the democratic alternative would mix things up again so much that it is now too difficult to speculate.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

SURPRISING RESULTS OF SOUTH TYROL CENSUS

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 25 Jan 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Lina Coletti: "German Spoken Here"]

[Text] Some say it is a mistake. Some say it is due to a high ethnic German birth rate. But others are suspicious.

It came as a real shock to many. But the first official returns of the census, which provided for an ethnic choice in Bolzano province, leave no doubt: South Tyroleans declaring themselves Italian-speaking show a net decline, while those who claim to be German-speaking are increasing.

This shrinkage in the Italian community occurs in larger proportions in the "low" zone near Trentino. There, the drop reached 6 percent. However, the decline is also very visible in communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, where the opposite was expected. These communities account for 46 percent of the population. In any event, the decline exceeds the most pessimistic expectations.

In the period 1971-81, the Italian population has decreased by 4 percent, from 33.3 to 29.4 percent. Meanwhile, the South Tyrolean proportion rose by 3.4 percent, and the Ladinis by 0.5 percent (in Val Gardena, with maximums at Selva and Ortisei, the Ladinis increased their share by 7 percent).

Attempts are obviously being made in the province to adjust the figure by insisting (a) on the temporary nature of the data, (b) the higher German birth rate, (c) an allegedly higher Italian emigration rate in the last decade. Yet the urgent question remains: what has caused people to take the option of joining the larger group? Is it an assimilationist impulse to join the larger group? Is it a kind of admiration for a "Germanic" model? Is it a choice to take on the common, non-national autonomy of an almost monopolistic majority group?

"Essentially opportunism," most people say, because the region is governed on numerical proportions between ethnic groups, and the system assigns social spending, public housing and jobs on the basis of the size of these groups (hitherto, about 1/3 to the Italians, 2/3 to the Germans and a minimum to the Ladinis).

In sum, the slogan must have been, "You have a better chance to be better off as a German."

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A farmer, who wished to remain anonymous, said, "I calculated what I would get in subsidies from the Bauernbund, the South Tyrol Farmers' League, and what I would get from Coldiretti. I opted for the Bauernbund."

A city civil servant said, "My career was blocked because my group, the Italians, had already filled its quota of jobs, but as a 'German' I might be promoted."

A boy studying in Austria confessed, "As a 'German' I'll get discounts on the train to Vienna, pay lower taxes and avoid quota troubles. These may be trivial reasons for some people, but not for me."

V.M., a worker, explained, "I use public housing, and I knew that the waiting list here in Bolzano requires fewer points for Germans than Italians. It's a way to discourage immigration, you know? Make housing unavailable so people won't come up here, right? Anyhow, it's crazy to use proportions in this way, because people figure it out, as at Santa Maria di Ora, a hospice that uses it to protect old people."

Giuseppe Sfreondini, a socialist and president of the Provincial Council, explained that this zone is among the richest and has the largest public budget ("Last year the budget was 1.2 trillion lire for 430,000 inhabitants"), that several increases were made in agriculture and tourism, which are traditionally South Tyrolean, while decreases occurred in industry, which is traditionally "Italian." V.M. confirms it: "That means that many, especially among my fellow workers, did not come and stay as expected. Many, in fact, had to leave. Like Lancia, which has had to reduce its personnel by about 1,300 in less than 10 years. Was the agreement supposed to be on a development plan that would artificially modify relations between the three ethnic groups? Actually, the opposite has happened, and the census results are there to prove it."

According to Alex Langer, leader of Neue Linke-Nuova Sinistra [New Left], the census has institutionalized the "ethnic lock-up" and created a real "apartheid" intended to discriminate between people on the basis of language and ethnic group. "The choices," he said, "were coerced and therefore not valid, especially for minority language groups such as Slovenes, Flemish, Gypsies, etc., for whoever does not fit into the rigid classification of the three ethnic groups and have to choose one or the other so as not to be cut off from certain advantages."

For Langer, then, the data are false, false and untenable. ("Because they were gathered with incomplete and contradictory instructions.") False, untenable and extorted ("The climate was, 'Don't refuse unless you want to lose your rights. Even Bishop Gargitter, a German, has publicly called for the right of solidarity with one's own group.'")

The fact remains that the consequences will probably be heavy for everyone and will threaten even more an already precarious balance. People say up here that whoever wins will be exposed willy nilly to the arrogance and temptation of new power while whoever loses will make increasingly larger demands of guarantees for his ethnic group.

It is also being said that the struggle between ethnic groups will be rekindled and that there will be a revival of nationalisms. And it will finally guarantee that old plans will be dusted off and brought out again ("For an Alpine foothill zone

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dominated by conservative or even reactionary Germans, for example,") Even the Heimatbund is taking advantage of this, as well as the SVP [South Tyrol People's Party] hawks, who have again put forth the plan of separating South Tyrol from Italy.

For Langer, the census shows a serious threat to harmony, autonomy, and even the "pactlet" (as is known, the region's special status was initiated in 1948. In 1969, a "pactlet" was drawn up with special concessions, and it established an operative calendar for their implementation). Autonomy and the "pactlet" are seen as great democratic achievements, but people obviously feel that they are being administered otherwise. "It is no accident," says Langer, "for example, that great strides have been made in proportionalism, which is an instrument of division, but not in bilingualism, which is an instrument of communication."

Meanwhile, even Italian political elements have begun making heavy remarks. They had been tolerating the Volkspartei [SVP], which was considered the sole mediator with the German-language population. "When a provincial law gives special privileges to one group," said Franco Ravagnani, secretary of the Christian Democrats, concerning increased subsidies for agriculture and commerce, "we are faced with the misuse of the instruments of autonomy."

Even Silvius Magnago, who has been the unquestioned, charismatic leader of the Volkspartei for 40 years, is not exactly unperturbed, because now some people will accuse him of using autonomy not to stabilize the province but to feed new extremisms. Moreover, it will be hard for him, as Ravagnani himself says, "to make further requests now that some guarantees already made have led to the results that appear in the census."

Those of the New Left, who have no direct parliamentary representation, will propose through the Radicals that the results not be certified, thus preventing them from being made official through publication in the GAZZETTA. ("So that the proportions are not recodified for another decade," says Langer.) Meanwhile, though, the argument is increasing, especially among the "losers," i.e. the Italians. They are in a different position from the Germans, who are solidly united and proud of their ethnic identity; 90 percent of them are supporters of a single party, the SVP; and they are rich, because they are anchored in heavily subsidized sectors such as commerce, agriculture, and tourism. The Italians, on the other hand, tend to remain unaware of their common cultural background, handicapped by their lesser economic power, ignorant of the "other" language (15 percent have mastered German), divided by political ideologies, and unprepared for their rendezvous with autonomy.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

OPPOSITION TO ETA'S 'REVOLUTIONARY TAXES' STIFFENS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 pp 18-21

[Text] After enduring the most spectacular process of economic ruin in the recent history of Western Europe, the Basque nationalist leaders, under pressure by a large part of their party members and sympathizers, and especially by the 4,000 victims of extortion by ETA terrorists, who will have to pay, in France, a total amount greater than 15 billion pesetas, have started open warfare against the terrorist organization. Town by town, village by village. It is the rebellion of the victims that on 26 January, when 20 days had elapsed since his kidnaping, they had their most dramatic symbol in industrialist Jose Lipperheide.

In a desperate attempt, the ETA military terrorists replied with new assaults, with explosives and gunfire against the brave persons ready to challenge them and not to pay a cent. Bravery against extortion. But the fact that historical dynamics is working against the assassins disguised as revolutionary politicians is demonstrated by the fact of a lack of support among the Basque society, as Mario Fernandez himself, new vice president of the autonomous government of Vitoria analyzed in his interview granted to CAMBIO 16: "In order to organize a proamnesty demonstration or one on behalf of a specific hunger strike, they have to stand with a poster in front of those of us who came out of the Athletic-Royal Society soccer game 2 weeks ago in Bilbao, and organize a demonstration in this way. Otherwise, 200 or 300 persons in the duty shift go on demonstrations that weekend."

In summary, Xavier Arzallus himself answered ETA's challenge with a categorical: If ETA wants fear, there will be fear for all!

The declaration of total war made by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the autonomous government of Vitoria against ETA, mobilizing the population against the acts of economic extortion, brought to the surface the real background of the Basque problem: the existence of a hard class struggle with the force of arms.

ETA's number one objective is, and has been, the impoverishment of the Basque Country. Over 3 million citizens in that community have undergone, directly or indirectly, as personal witnesses of history, the most spectacular process of economic ruin in Western Europe in the last few decades.

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Four thousand professional men, businessmen, financiers, small merchants, civil servants all over the Basque country have been intimidated into paying a total amount greater than 15 billion pesetas.

Each demand ranged between 3 and 20 million: "If you do not deliver it within the specified time, we shall seek you out to execute you," the message from the terrorists concludes.

The request for the so-called revolutionary tax includes another sentence that extends the arm of terrorism to other continents: "If you notify the police, or any kind of setback whatsoever occurs in delivery, you will also be executed wherever you may be, even if you leave Europe."

In recent years, the terrorized victims went in person or sent intermediaries to the French Basque towns of St. Jean de Luz, Biarritz or Bayonne to pay the tribute of fear to "Senor Otxia" in used banknotes with unconnected serial numbers. This was the most tangible proof of the impunity with which ETA terrorism operates in the south of France. Billions in illicit money that is "laundered" later in French agencies or other foreign centers.

But this extortion has touched bottom. In view of the internal and public rebellion by the victims, the PNV and Basque government leaders have said enough! to this economic bloodletting by facing up to the reign of terror by weapons.

With the call by lendakari [president] Carlo Garaikoetxea "not to be intimidated or give in to extortion" and a unanimous reaction by the people who gathered in their districts, places of work, associations and public opinion media, two victims of the "revolutionary tax," the mayors of Guecho and Santurce, put out the watchword: "We shall not pay."

"It would be a morale boost for me," Jose Antonio Loidi, mayor of Santurce, said, while his colleague from Guecho, Dr Urretxua, stated: "I believe that in that way my stand can serve as an example to encourage the others."

Indignation in the batzokis (PNV houses) of the towns was evident. "If something happens to our mayor, we shall respond." These reactions aloud were repeated in a number of public establishments in Algorta, as a watchword that "he who wants to be informed, take note."

In this atmosphere, the PNV municipal boards all over the area met in the party's building in Algorta. Over 100 representatives of the party approved unanimously a note representing, because of its harshness, a definite war communique against ETA. Finally, the Basques were taking a hard stand.

In this communique, after asking the extortion victims to make their name known, the municipal boards of the eight towns stated that "social justice travels on paths other than assassination, extortion and terror."

Nevertheless, the last point in the communique was the most definite one, because the threat became a counterthreat against ETA and its collaborators: "We point out, the eighth point stated, "that we all know each other, in the Basque Country and very especially in the towns, and we know who is who, who

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are in agreement with those methods and who abstain when there is a proposal to reject this reprehensible recourse."

Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity]

In view of these words, those who live in the Basque Country or who are familiar with the reality of the problem know that the warning was addressed to the members of the Herri Batasuna extreme left nationalist coalition and to its spokesmen, who, on many occasions, refused to condemn this kind of action by ETA terrorism. And that it is not merely going to be words. There will be something more.

This was realized by Mario Fernandez himself, who stated, in an interview granted to CAMBIO 16: "I have the feeling that there is an overwhelming majority absolutely in agreement (not to pay). Some of them even, with that voluntarism typical of our party, will probably be ready to put the last sentence in that statement by the municipal boards into practice."

This firm stand ran through the Basque Country like powder. In some towns, like Orozco, the threat, although verbal, was transmitted directly to persons sympathizing with ETA. Persons who up to now had kept silent about the threatening messages were now commenting to their friends and were revealing them, in spite of family annoyance. Of the 4,000 persons affected by the tax, not all were industrial magnates or Neguri businessmen.

Thus, in Algorta, it was learned that a former dentist, a gudaris (Basque fighters) captain during the [civil] war, a foreman, an industrialist, two physicians, several merchants, and so on, had been victims of extortion by the terrorist organization. Four physicians in the Portugaleta clinic were affected. The surprise was great in nationalist circles. "What, he too? But he has been a party member all his life!

With its veto on the revolutionary tax and its severe condemnation of ETA, the party presided by Xabier Arzallus and the Basque government have declared open war against ETA members, playing the most severe and most difficult game in its recent history. A war that does not evade many risks, including physical risks, that PNV is ready to assume. Attacks with explosives on Guipuzcoa industrialists or the shooting of a San Sebastian businessman within the space of a few hours, in connection with failure to pay the revolutionary tax, were proof of the nature of these risks.

"We cannot leave the mayor alone now," a well-known attorney in Guecho said. "His stand must be extended to the whole Basque Country. Those who are brave enough to make their rejection public merit the support of all the people. Public support and with names."

In this connection, the PNV will have to have its own party members who still are paying the tax decide bravely to refuse. It must be condemned, as the mayors of Guecho and Santurce have done and the furtive border passages must be used only for traditional tourism.



The increasing part being played by ETA in the terrorist International was also revealed with the statements by a "repentant" [terrorist], Fernando Valiche, leader of the First Line organization.

The historic trial of the commander of this organization, taking place in Milan, made it possible to become acquainted with a memorandum from Veliche in which he revealed that Gianantonio Zanetti was made responsible for establishing connections with ETA.

In June 1978, Gianantonio Zanetti went to Spain and made an agreement with ETA on the holding of training courses for members of First Line, the Communist Fighters Formations and other terrorist groups in what is known, as a whole, as "armed party" of Italy, that is to say, organizations basically in agreement on confronting the democratic state violently.

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Meanwhile, a new slogan has emerged in the Basque Country using the statement by a businessman, Jose Maria Vizcaino, president of the Guipuzcoa employers association Adegui. The slogan "Not to pay is more abertzale" [nationalistic, patriotic] has begun to spread around.

For a long time, the PNV was accused of ambiguous respect for the point of view of ETA, in spite of some sporadic condemnatory statements. Suddenly, it has launched forth in an open war against terrorism. It is increasing its statements. It is organizing its members and it is criticizing both branches of ETA severely and openly. What has happened?

The reply comes from attorney Mario Fernandez, the new vice president of the autonomous Basque government: "In recent times, terrorism, and particularly the revolutionary tax, have been contributing considerably to the deterioration of the economic situation of the Basque Country.

"Therefore," Mario Fernandez adds, "the revolutionary tax not only does not protect the interests of the Basque working people, as is said customarily in those cyclostyle communiques that ETA is accustomed to issuing, but, rather, it directly harms the Basque Country workers."

For the right arm of Garaikoetxea, the challenge hurled against the ETA now by the Basque government cannot serve for seeking, in this attitude, an individual physical protection of all the recipients of a threat or coercion by the ETA terrorist organization.

"I believe that what the Basque government has taken on the commitment to lead must be a reaction of public opinion," Mario Fernandez states, mentioning the assassination of engineer Ryan as the people's first massive reaction. This event served both to weaken the terrorist organization and the political groups that may be more or less defending their stands."

That is true. The murder of the Lemoniz engineer Jose Maria Ryan, that occurred on 6 February--a year ago now--gave rise to a general strike and large-scale demonstrations by the people--like the one at the portal--against ERA terrorism in the Basque Country.

During that day, 9 February 1981, 300,000 persons demonstrated in the three Basque capitals, in a meeting held by political and labor union forces like the PNV, PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], PC, Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque Left], CCOO [Workers Commissions], UGT [General Union of Workers, ELA-STV [Basque Workers Solidarity] and with the support of UCD [Democratic Center Union] and AP [Popular Alliance]. Nationalist leaders, like Xabier Arzallus himself, socialists Nicolas Redondo and Txiki Benegas, or communists Mario Onaindia, Roberto Lerchundi and Marcelino Camacho, were in the large demonstration on that day in Bilbao, under the umbrellas that covered the crowd from the rain.

The Euskadiko Ezkerra deputy stated categorically, in the capital of Guipuzcoa: "Today I say without any scruples that they are few, but with fascist methods. Fascism has been in the streets of San Sebastian, without uniform, shielded by the acronym HB (Herri Batasuna)."

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Twelve months later, a Vizcaya industrialist, Jose Lipperheide, lived minutes and seconds in the clutches of ERA between life and death, because he refused to pay the revolutionary tax.

In that lengthy situation of dramatism, in which sectors close to PNV and Euskadiko Ezkerra maintained, sadly, until Wednesday that ETA military would finally kill Lipperheide "regardless of how much negotiation," the family was still awaiting proof that he was alive, while the kidnapers revealed that solution of this kidnaping presented more problems than the kidnaping of Dr Iglesias Puga.

The senseless action by ETA political-military in the kidnaping of the father of the world famous singer Julio Iglesias, as well as the subsequent discovery of a sizable arsenal of weapons by the police in the Vizcaya town of Erandio, gave rise to conflicting reactions.

In spite of the fact that the political-military organization of ETA announced in its communique, after the freeing of Dr Iglesias by the police, that the kidnaping did not imply a breaking of the truce and that they had perpetrated it only for economic purposes, fear that the terrorist organization is returning to its old tricks has alarmed the Basque Country and the Madrid authorities.

The statements by Mario Onaindia, leader of Euskadiko Ezkerra, who is playing a key role in the process of pacification, who made a statement with an optimistic note after his interview with the minister of the Interior, Juan Jose Roson in Madrid last week, were not entirely shared in Basque circles.

"I believe that there is a political desire by the ETA p-m [political-military] and by the government to maintain the positive dynamics originated by the truce and acts like the return of political prisoners to the Basque Country might be the basis for continuing on that course toward normalization," Mario Onaindia said.

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Masters of Terror

[Text] The ETA members have graduated as professors of terrorism, training other European groups that are part of the staff of "international terrorism." An INTERPOL official informed CAMBIO 16 that last December the strategic leadership of what constitutes the International of terrorism met in the Swiss city of Lausanne:

The Italian Red Brigades, the Fraction of the German Red Army, the Irish IRA, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and ETA.

INTERPOL is sure that the wave of attacks on United States diplomats and senior military officers was discussed in the meeting.

At the same time, it is obvious that the terrorist assembly was the result of public invitations drawn up by several of the attending organizations to coordinate their activity against the European democratic governments.

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One of the immediate results of this collaboration was the arrest by the Italian police of a Syrian citizen who was transporting detonators and explosives intended for the Red Brigades.

Apparently, the connection with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine extremists is what ensures the supply of Soviet-made rocket launchers and grenades, used by the leading guerrilla groups in Europe.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

BASQUE OFFICIAL ACCUSES ETA OF DESCENDING INTO GANGSTERISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 pp 22-23

[Interview with the new Basque vice president, Mario Fernandez by CAMBIO 16, in his official office, in Vitoria, date not given]

[Text] After a meteoric political career, in less than 2 years young Bilbao attorney Mario Fernandez, 38 years old, was appointed vice president of the Basque government, last week. Skillful and clever, the vice president of the Basque Country is also regarded as a hard man in the negotiations with Madrid. A few days after his appointment, the Basque politician received CAMBIO 16 in his official office of Lakua, in Vitoria. Mario Fernandez stated categorically and without mincing words that his party and the government will answer the challenge hurled by ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] members. He asked the Basque people to "rearm themselves morally," in order to eradicate terrorist blackmail and extortions that "are only causing work stoppage and ruin for the Basque Country."

CAMBIO 16: Has the fact that now people in the majority party are also being threatened obliged the autonomous government and the Basque Nationalist Party to declare themselves more clearly and categorically against ETA and its extortions?

Mario Fernandez: I must make it clear that Lipperheide does not belong to the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and the latest statements have had as their excuse precisely Lipperheide's kidnaping. Kidnaped, according to what we know, as a result of not paying the tax demanded of him and, still more concretely, owing to a presumed action of setting an example with regard to business who had refused to pay that vile extortion. PNV members had previously received this kind of letters. The conflict has certainly been caused, basically, on the one hand, by the economic situation. On the other hand, by the constantly increasing maturity of the labor union federations, of employer organizations and, to a certain extent also, the consolidation of institutions. Reactivation of violence has not occurred as a consequence of the breaking of this prevailing calm streak, but, rather, as the result of ETA's internal difficulties themselves. Just as it has difficulties with regard to infrastructure and released persons, and so on, it also has them with regard to

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financial means. Thus, when ETA p-m ["polis-milis," ETA political-military organization] made itself responsible for the kidnaping of Dr Iglesias, it argued in substance that it was not a question of breaking the truce, but, rather, "because we have financial problems." Because they said this so naturally, the usual procedure is to solve treasury problems by means of acts of violence, of extortion, on persons, regardless of their status. That is lapsing into gangsterism.

CAMBIO 16: What is your evaluation of Lipperheide's kidnaping? Do you not think that it is more political than the kidnaping of Dr Iglesias, or is there a substantial difference between the two kidnapings?

Mario Fernandez: I would not be so categorical to the effect that it is a political kidnaping, unless the adjective political refers to the fact that it is not simply the consequence of solely obtaining a ransom in money. If that is the acceptation, I agree. What has been attempted is an effect on a very concrete class in the Basque Country, the business class. Leaving to one side any kind of stand of an ideological nature, it is absolutely clear that all the political parties in Parliament, excluding, therefore, those parties not represented in Parliament, realize that the economic situation of the Basque Country can be solved by means of public sector actions, but that it is absolutely indispensable for private initiative to contribute to the recovery.

CAMBIO 16: Nevertheless, there is another interpretation that states that ETA could not continue to put up with the harsh criticisms by the Basque government and by the PNV.

Mario Fernandez: I am also convinced that it is a challenge. But I believe that only this is being sought. It must be borne in mind, also, that not only a businessman has been sought, but, rather, a businessman whom they are trying to adorn with the famous topic of oligarchy (he lives in Neguri and is connected with great names through family or business ties). But I agree that the second point is also occurring and it is a challenge that we are ready to answer.

CAMBIO 16: How can that moral rearmament be achieved? Do you believe, for example, that the very harsh note of some municipal boards in the Basque Country may contribute to it?

Mario Fernandez: When the persons most directly affected ask for concrete acts, there is a tendency to downgrade, not only the significance, but even the effectiveness of stands that may seem to be strictly moral. It is taken for granted that the stand of the PNV and of lendakari [meaning unknown] Garaikoetxea has harmed the ETA. Nevertheless, I realize that anyone who suffers in an immediate way from aggression is much inclined to regard the solution of statements or stands of a political nature as valid and exclusive. But I do not reject or belittle the degrees of effectiveness of this kind of actions. If, finally, the people are becoming aware that, in order to pay the terrorist revolutionary tax, it is not necessary to be more abertzale [patriotic] than to refuse to pay it, and that, at the present time, a person is more abertzale by refusing to pay the terrorist tax than in the contrary case, I think that we can cause considerable harm.

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CAMBIO 16: The last point in the resolutions of the municipal boards is almost a declaration of war ("we know who is who, we know them all, and so on.").

Mario Fernandez: Of course, obviously, that cannot be the government's language. The government has to seek actions of a constitutional nature. We cannot set up here a kind of field of aggravating circumstances.

CAMBIO 16: From the government's point of view, how do you evaluate the loss of influence and the scanty mobilization power that the groups close to ETA have been undergoing for a year now?

Mario Fernandez: True. There has been a considerable decrease in popular support of these organizations. Then almost situations that would be anecdotal, if it were not because this country is in no mood for too many anecdotes, should be recalled. In order to organize a demonstration for amnesty, or on behalf of a more or less certain specific hunger strike, of certain political prisoners, it is necessary to stand with a poster in front of those of us who came out of the Athletic-Royal Society game 2 weeks ago in Bilbao, and in this way a demonstration can be organized, because, otherwise, the 200 or 300 persons in the duty shift go on demonstrations that weekend. What concerns us is that this kind of decline in points, or in the voting records of these radical groups, may not have definite aspect, may not become lasting, as a result of topics like the Arregui topic, or an Almeria in Basque. Obviously, this calm spell that we are all displaying at the present time would be broken very significantly.

CAMBIO 16: A businessman, Jose Maria Vizcaino, said, in an interview granted to DIARIO 16, that Basque businessmen have felt very isolated with regard to ETA and that there are government, party and labor union responsibilities in this abandonment.

Mario Fernandez: Vizcaino is a very brilliant and representative spokesman of Basque businessmen. I believe that he is right, because, for a long time, businessmen, by definition, have been the bad guys in the motion picture. Because, implicitly, we were being fed with the notion--and those were the tactics of ETA--that if we are businessmen, by definition we must necessarily connect the word businessman with exploitation and not necessarily with the creation of wealth. Then it may be right, in that connection, to say that businessmen have been the bad guys in the motion picture. Businessmen would not escape responsibility, either, from the point of view of the Administration. But I believe that there also is something imputable, to a certain extent, to businessmen and it is the fact that they too have not known how to open up to society and explain what their function is. I believe that this might be somewhat the division of responsibilities.

CAMBIO 16: The resumption of activity by the "poli-milis" has caused great concern in most of the Basque political sectors. How do you interpret this new event after the kidnapping of Dr Iglesias?

Mario Fernandez: We would give a very negative evaluation to a breaking of the truce, because it is true that the ETA p-m truce has contributed, up to now, to the process of consolidation of democracy in the entire State and,

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in particular, in the process of statutory development here. A breaking of that truce concerns us extraordinarily. But what concerns us most is not the fact that ETA p-m as an organization might break the truce in the near future, but, rather, the fact that, judging from the reports that we have, persons in ETA p-m might be in danger of changing their affiliation by losing a "p" to become members of the military organization. This really does worry us.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

ARMY CAPTAIN FEELS ARMORED DIVISION LACKS AIR DEFENSE

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 70-71

[Article by Captain Jacques Vuillemin who entered the French Army in 1962 and has served in the 7th Armored Division at Besancon: "Air Defense of the Type-77 Armored Division]

[Text] The armored division has no lack of offensive weapons and equipment. But in the opinion of the author of this article, its air defense capabilities have been neglected. An air attack is so sudden and brief that the division cannot rapidly rely on support from corps air defense units. To correct this deficiency, the author recommends that each armored division be authorized an organic air defense unit. The views expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect Ministry of Defense or military command policies.

Denied its own organic air defense units, the type-77 [1977] armored division is highly vulnerable to air attack. Such a deficiency can seriously impair the division's effectiveness.

Without waiting for the results of current or future studies, all armored divisions should immediately be issued air defense weapons enabling them to fully meet modern combat requirements.

Vulnerable

The type-77 armored division's main characteristics are its firepower, mobility, flexibility of employment, and logistical self-sufficiency. A scout company gives it an extended reconnaissance capability and an antitank company reinforces its long-range antitank capability.

The division is also characterized, however, by a complete absence of organic antiaircraft weapons. This shortcoming is especially serious in that the airborne enemy--fixed wing aircraft and helicopters--is continuously capable of operating in the contact area and in depth.

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Easy targets for enemy aircraft include: signal company vehicles, on the move or in static positions, transportation company convoys, and the division rear area.

It is indeed paradoxical to note that while France's defense industry produces numerous and reputable air defense weapon systems, the French Army is one of the most ill-equipped armies in this respect. This deficiency is likely to jeopardize seriously the operational readiness of our divisions.

In rebuttal it can be said, and rightly so, that armored divisions do have, with their 20-mm guns, many self-defense weapons, and that they may also be protected by corps air defense units attached to the divisions. In this regard, we must be highly realistic, however.

Actually the army corps will not be able to attach air defense units to every division. The Roland [surface-to-air missile] batteries attached to an armored division cannot meet all requirements: protection of tank regiments on the move or in waiting positions; protection of main supply routes, command posts, and the division rear area.

As for the 20-mm gun, without belittling that weapon's capabilities it would be misleading to believe that by itself alone this gun can provide an adequate answer to the problem posed by the air threat.

It is impossible to ask the same troops to maintain continuous and simultaneous surveillance of the air space and also the compartment of terrain they are assigned to defend or capture, with its ridges, woods, and borders from which deadly fire may erupt at any moment.

Such essential actions of an effective response to the air threat as surveillance and warning can be taken under good conditions, in other words continuously, only by personnel to whom these actions are assigned as a primary mission. Only a specialized unit can perform this mission round-the-clock. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that the type-77 armored division be assigned an organic air defense unit.

#### Organic Unit

The presence of an air defense unit within a division--a unit continuously performing surveillance, warning, and identifications tasks for the benefit of the other units--would considerably enhance that division's capability of countering an air attack.

It would be desirable to equip that unit--a battery or battalion--with tractor-drawn antiaircraft guns characterized by flexibility of employment and simplicity of operation.

Studies are currently being conducted for the purpose of defining the weapons--guns or missiles--with which to equip forward area units.

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But we should be able to cope with this danger right now, without waiting for the dubious result of studies that are at times very lengthy. Appropriate weapons are available at the present time: single 20-mm and 30-mm guns, and twin 20-mm guns. So let us use them.

Air attacks are a key element of modern combat. The air situation will not always be as balanced as it is too often depicted in field exercise scenarios. The contact area will be the preferred field of activity for attack helicopters. It is no longer solely a matter of familiarizing personnel with this aspect of combat. They must at the same time be instructed and trained without respite to handle this problem and become proficient in employing specialized equipment.

Assignment of an organic air defense unit to the armored division will make it possible to achieve this dual objective in the immediate future while at the same time improving the division's operational readiness.

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GENERAL

SPAIN

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS NOT MOST INFLUENTIAL, POLL SHOWS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Feb 82 pp 33-35

[Article by Jose Manuel Arija]

[Text] In Spain it is the government which has the most influence, followed by the political parties. After that, power, command or influence over what takes place in the country belongs to terrorism, television, the United States, the army and other unofficial elements. This, at least, was the opinion of those surveyed by the DYM Institute when they were asked the following question:

"On this list I am showing you are several social groups, institutions or countries which have political, social or economic influence in Spain. Which of them, in your opinion, has the greatest influence over events in our country? The second greatest? Third? Fourth? Fifth?"

On looking over the results, the first thing that catches one's attention is the broad distribution of power seen by the middle-class Spaniard. The citizen does not see a single center or at least a preponderance of power, but rather a mingling of powers.

He distributes influence, giving the higher ratings to two political institutions: the government (18 percent) and the political parties (14 percent). Following this are three groups which differ widely among themselves: terrorism (9 percent), television (8 percent) and the army (5 percent), and to a foreign country, the United States (6 percent).

Cortes Not Very Influential

That is to say, the formal institutions--government and political parties--, in the opinion of those surveyed, have one-third of the power, while the other influential groups have not quite one-fourth. The remaining influences on our national life are quite varied. Like a bunch of small prizes in a lottery, they touch upon all the most important public organizations and institutions. The small amount of influence attributed to the Cortes (3 percent) is noteworthy. Spaniards have a view of politics which is not too parliamentary, in spite of the fact that from time to time they insist that congress and senate are the basic axis around which important questions are

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debates and decided. Those interested should find out whether this low percentage accorded to the Cortes was influenced by the consensus, whether the middle-class Spaniard feels that way because he believes the parties decide questions outside the deputies' chamber or because he believes that anyone who governs does so without any controls.

The fact is that in spite of the necessary provisos, we continue to have a centralist view of political activity. Only 2 percent of the influence was accorded to local administrations--town councils and autonomous communities--, while the Central Administration's quota is 35 percent--government, political parties and the Cortes.

Among economic centers of influence on power, those surveyed indicated the banking community (4 percent) and the multinationals (2 percent). It is curious to note that a greater influence on society was attributed to each of these sectors of the economy as a group than to organized businessmen, the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] (1 percent).

Among outside influences, the great power attributed to the United States stands out, perhaps because the interviewees were influenced by the proximity of the date of the survey to that of the parliamentary debate over Spain's entry into NATO. On the other hand, the European Economic Community (1 percent) occupied a lower position than might at first have been expected. The influence attributed to the USSR, only a few tenths of a percent, indicates that almost nobody believes it has any influence on the Spanish Government's decisions.

As for the press and radio (2 percent), their capacity to influence, in spite of having awarded themselves the title of "fourth estate," is also low, particularly compared with the great influence accorded television. However, if one adds together all the communications media, they would be in third place with 10 percent of the influence over what happens in the country.

In studying the ratings of the various institutions in second, third, fourth and fifth places, one can see how the various organizations and institutions redistribute themselves and compensate for one another. Groups which received a low rating in first place occupy higher percentages in the following places, as with press and radio, the Cortes, the unions or the multinationals. Others, such as the church, the army or the banking community, maintain the same percentages in all places.

#### Principal Institutions

The results of the principal institutions, according to the segments into which the survey is divided, are as follows:

The government (18 percent). The influence attributed to the government is greater among persons between the ages of 31 and 45 years, those from the Levante and eastern and central areas, the lower middle class and small towns. Those from Madrid and the south credit the government with the least influence.

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Political Parties (14 percent). On the other hand, Madrid and Andalusia feel the political parties have much more influence than the government. In addition, the upper classes seem to consider the parties more influential, as do the youth and Barcelona.

Terrorism (9 percent). Madrid seems to be the area most concerned by the power of terrorism. Curiously enough the north--along with the Levante--, although it is the part of the country most affected by it, attributes little influence to terrorism. Women consider terrorism more important than do men.

The army (5 percent). The relationship between terrorism and the army is reversed. Thus those who concede less influence to terrorism concede more to the army, and vice versa. Men, the upper classes and the northern and southern areas of the country attribute greater influence to the army.

The United States (6 percent). The younger the age group and the higher the social class, the greater is the tendency to attribute more influence to the United States. Large cities, rather than smaller ones, also credit the Americans with more influence.

Television (8 percent). Persons under 45 years of age, the upper and upper middle classes, Madrid and the northern part of the country attribute the most power to television. Women give it quite a bit more than men.

The survey, done by the Instituto DYM, S.A., was taken last November, using a sampling of 2,000 persons and with a dependability rate of 95.5 percent. The people surveyed included men and women from 16 to 65 years of age.

Table 1.

## WHO HAS THE MOST INFLUENCE IN SPAIN

	<u>Percent</u>
Government	18
Political Parties	14
Terrorism	9
Television	8
The United States	6
Army	5
Church	4
Banking Community	4
The Cortes	3
Multinational Firms	2
The Courts	2
Unions	2
Press and Radio	2
Others (local governments, ultra-rightist officials, employers' groups, the EEC, autonomous communities)	6
No answer	15

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Table 2. DISTRIBUTION IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

	1st Place	2d Place	3d Place (Percent)	4th Place	5th Place	Total
Government	18	10	8	7	5	48
Political Parties	14	11	9	8	6	48
Terrorism	9	6	5	4	3	27
Television	8	6	6	7	5	32
The United States	6	4	3	4	3	20
Army	5	5	6	5	5	26
Church	4	4	4	3	3	18
Banking Community	4	4	4	4	3	19
The Cortes	3	5	6	5	5	24
Multinationals	2	4	4	3	4	17
Courts	2	1	1	2	1	7
Unions	2	4	4	3	4	17
Press and Radio	2	5	6	7	6	26

Table 3. WHO OR WHAT HAS MOST INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY? IN %

	TOTAL	(7) EDADES				(8) ZONAS								(17) STATUS				(21) HABITAT				(22) SEXO	
		16-30	31-45	46-65	(9) Este	(10) Levante	(11) Sur	(12) Centro	(13) Oeste	(14) Norte	(15) Madrid	(16) Barrio	(17) Alta	(18) Media	(19) Baja	5,000	30,000	mas de	200,000	200,000	mas de	(23) Hombre	(24) Mujer
El Gobierno (1)	18	17	21	17	24	26	11	24	15	21	13	18	16	19	19	20	16	18	18	18	18	18	18
Los Partidos políticos (2)	14	16	13	11	11	11	16	10	10	13	16	16	15	13	14	12	12	15	13	15	13	15	15
El Terrorismo (3)	9	10	8	9	11	4	10	7	7	8	14	8	8	10	9	10	9	9	8	10	8	10	10
La Televisión (4)	8	8	10	6	6	5	7	7	7	10	12	7	12	9	5	5	11	8	7	9	7	9	9
Los Estados Unidos (5)	6	8	5	3	6	7	4	4	7	9	4	6	9	6	4	4	7	6	6	5	6	5	5
El Ejército (6)	5	6	4	5	5	6	7	2	4	6	5	4	7	5	5	5	6	5	6	4	6	4	4

## Key:

- |                      |                               |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Government        | 13. Northeast                 |
| 2. Political Parties | 14. North Central             |
| 3. Terrorism         | 15. Madrid                    |
| 4. Television        | 16. Barcelona                 |
| 5. United States     | 17. Economic Status           |
| 6. Army              | 18. Upper, Upper Middle Class |
| 7. Age Group         | 19. Middle Class              |
| 8. Area              | 20. Lower Class               |
| 9. East              | 21. Population                |
| 10. Levante          | 22. Sex                       |
| 11. South            | 23. Male                      |
| 12. Central          | 24. Female                    |

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